This paper uses multi-period cross-sectional data on financial assets holdings to shed light on the postwar stability of money demand in the United States. I first present a new measure of the evolution of financial market participation, by relating participation to the extensive margins of money demand, and quantify the influence of wealth on participation decisions. I then relate the increase in participation to the period of "missing money" and to the subsequent higher interest rate elasticity of monetary aggregates. The paper indicates that time series estimations of money demand relationships are inherently flawed and tend to inappropriately suggest instability.
The importance of financial market participation cost heterogeneity has recently received attention in the study of money demand. Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (2000) , using the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances, and Attanasio, Guiso and Jappelli (2002) , using surveys on Italian households during the 1990s, have computed welfare costs of inflation by considering explicitly the extensive margins of money demand, i.e., households' decisions on whether or not to enter the financial market and hold part of their wealth in the form of non-monetary interest-bearing assets. In this paper, I use survey data over an extended time period, which allows me to exploit multiperiod cross-sections in order to present a new measure of the evolution of financial market participation and to link participation with the issue of the postwar stability of money demand.
First, the evolution of financial market participation since the early 1960s is presented and analyzed. The notion of participation considered in this paper differs from 2 other studies 1 of financial market participation. I consider specifically financial assets that are substitutable for money, in the sense that by paying some transaction cost, the assets considered, i.e., certificates of deposits, mutual funds, stocks and bonds, can be readily converted into transaction balances. Moreover, the surveys used here cover the past forty years. Both of these features will allow me to identify and assess the effects of large changes in extensive margins and to link participation with the postwar behavior of monetary aggregates.
The different cross-sections allow me to analyze the evolution and determinants of financial market participation and confirm the importance of wealth in participation decisions 2 . I report a 75 percent increase in non-monetary assets participation during the 1960s and 1970s, and confirm the finding of Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin that the probability that a household holds non-monetary assets is positively related to the level of its financial wealth. Indeed, the increase in real financial wealth during the 1960s and 1970s accounts for about a third of the increase in participation during that period. Moreover, the cross-sectional wealth elasticity of participation does not change significantly across periods, thus the effects of secular changes and crosssectional variations in real wealth on participation are the same.
The results are then used to address the apparent instability of monetary time series, by quantifying the influence of changes in financial market participation on 1 For studies of stocks participation, see, for example, Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) , and VissingJørgensen (2002) . Several publications (Economic Behavior Program Staff; Mandell et al., 1973; SCF reports in Federal Reserve Bulletins) reporting results of Surveys of Consumer Finances, present the evolution of various assets, but their groupings of assets differ from this study and they often include nonmarketable assets which are not taken into account here. The closest concept of participation was proposed by Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, although my definition considers some assets they include in "interest-bearing assets" as "monetary assets".aggregate money demand. I relate the increase in participation to the period of "missing money" and to the subsequent higher interest rate elasticity of monetary aggregates. The main idea is that as real financial wealth and the opportunity cost of money increased in the 1970s, more people found it worth it to pay the cost of participating in financial markets and hold part of their financial assets in the form of interest-bearing non-monetary assets, instead of holding their entire wealth in the form of monetary assets. This induced a downward shift in money demand as well as a higher interest rate elasticity, as only financial market participants are able to substitute between monetary and non-monetary financial assets when interest rates fluctuate. Thus, increases in financial market participation tend to inappropriately suggest progress in the transaction technology or scale economies in money holdings, and time series estimates of interest rate elasticity are flawed.
The second section presents the evolution of participation in non-monetary financial assets. Section 3 analyzes the determinants of the increase in participation, and section 4 relates the evolution of participation to the issue of money demand stability.
The last section concludes.
EVOLUTION OF FINANCIAL MARKET PARTICIPATION

Data Sources
This section presents how financial market participation has evolved during the postwar period in the United States. For reasons mentioned in the introduction, I
consider specifically financial assets that are substitutable for money, in the sense that by paying some transaction cost the assets considered can be readily converted into transaction balances. Thus, for example, I do not include pension funds, IRAs 4 or houses, but I include certificates of deposits. Characteristics, is the only pre-1980 survey that is directly comparable to the full samples from the post-1980 surveys, as it also includes an additional sample of highincome households and provides the most comprehensive and detailed inventory of consumers' financial assets of the pre-1980s surveys.
Monetary and Non-Monetary Assets: Definitions
The distinction between monetary and non-monetary assets is not always clear-cut, thus different alternatives will be considered. The main idea is that there are participation costs associated with non-monetary assets (NMA). These costs might include 3 Most information in this sub-section is developed in the codebooks of the different surveys and on the various reports published in different issues of Federal Reserve Bulletin. Both of these sources are available on the Federal Reserve Board internet site. See Avery et al., Economic Behavior Program Staff, Kennickell et al., and Projector et al. 4 The 1986 survey was designed to update some information in the 1983 survey. Assets were grouped in more aggregated categories, in a way that is not useful for my study of participation. For an analysis of earlier surveys, see publications by the Economic Behavior Program Staff, Mandell et al. (1973) , as well as survey reports from Federal Reserve Bulletins in the 1940s and 1950s. time learning about financial assets and following their development, bankers' time dealing with these assets, time filling out additional tax forms, as well as resources spent evaluating one's financial situation to determine the optimal mix of assets and maturities. However, NMA yield an interest rate at least equal to the 3-month Treasury bill rate. They are also marketable and readily substitutable for money, although at some transaction cost. Thus, for example, houses or pension funds are not considered as NMA for the purpose of this paper.
On the other hand, monetary assets (MA) have a negligible participation cost, as they are standard accounts offered "over the counter" by banks, but have a lower yield than short-term safe market rates, thus they provide transaction or monetary services 5 . The definition of MA corresponds to the concept of monetary services presented in Rotemberg, Driscoll, and Poterba (1995) , and to what the report by Kennickell, Starr-McCluer, and Surette (2000) on the 1998 SCF groups as "Transac- The most reliable survey years are in bold. CD: certificates of deposits; S: stocks; B: bonds; MF: stock and bond mutual funds; MMF: money market mutual funds; MMA: money market deposit accounts.
Columns (1), (2) and (3) From columns (1), (2) and (3), we see that most of the increase in participation occurred during the 1960s and 1970s, i.e., before financial deregulation, and the increase came mainly from an increased participation in certificates of deposits. As documented by Kennickell et al., the increase in participation in 1998 can be explained by the fact that the share of financial assets in total assets rose, mostly through direct and indirect holdings of stocks, whereas the share of non-financial as-sets, like vehicles, real estate, and businesses, fell correspondingly. We will come back to this fact in the next section.
The main finding of this section is thus a substantial increase in non-monetary assets participation in the 1960s and 1970s, and a stabilization of participation thereafter.
This evolution will be analyzed in section 3, and used to shed light on the evolution of monetary aggregates in section 4.
DETERMINANTS OF FINANCIAL MARKET PARTICIPATION
Approach and Empirical Model
In this section, I present evidence on the influence of changes in real financial wealth on participation, and discuss the contributions of changes in interest rates and participation costs to financial market participation. The main result is that about a third of the increase in participation during the 1960s and 1970s is due to an increase in real financial wealth during that period. Moreover, by isolating the influence of wealth on participation, we are able to determine that the factors accounting for the remaining two-thirds of the participation increase were linked to the particular economic and regulatory environment of the 1970s.
An empirical framework is presented by Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, who use the 1989 SCF and point out that a large fraction of households do not hold non-monetary assets. They suggest that there is a cost of participating in the financial market and present a model where households choose to participate in the financial market, i.e., adopt non-monetary assets, only if the participation cost is smaller than the benefit of participating, i.e.,
where ψ is the participation cost, A is the total amount of financial assets, i.e., monetary and non-monetary assets, held by the household, α is the fraction of assets invested in non-monetary assets once the participation cost has been paid, that represents the intensive margins of money demand, and R is the interest rate differential between non-monetary and monetary assets, i.e., the opportunity cost of monetary assets.
I first display some evidence on the importance of real financial wealth on partici- and 1983, and remained almost constant thereafter. We can therefore compute the share of the increase in participation attributable to a change in wealth, which turns out to be about one-third 12 . Similar calculations with a semi-parametric approach, using estimated probit curves as the probability of participation as a function of wealth, yield similar results. It is interesting to note that the factors accounting for the remaining two-thirds of the increase in participation during the 1970s do not 12 This fraction varies slightly across years as the opportunity cost of monetary assets fluctuates. In 1998, the share of financial assets in total assets rose, and this change in real financial wealth accounts for all of the increase in participation that year. When compared to 1962, the increase in financial wealth accounts for almost half of the increase in participation in that case.
13 affect participation at all during the 1980s and 1990s. These factors are thus linked with particular developments that occurred in the 1970s, and their role is assessed in the next section.
Results from probit estimations are displayed in , 1962, 1983, 1989, 1992, 1995 and 1998 Adding additional demographic explanatory variables to the equation does not change the coefficient on wealth significantly, and the effects of these additional variables are negligible and insignificant.
Contribution of Interest Rates and Participation Costs
Attributing the remaining part of changes in participation to variations in interest rates and participation costs is a difficult task, as participation costs are not observed.
Another problem is the measurement of the opportunity cost, as non-monetary assets include stocks and bonds, for example. In the computations of this section, I will use the 6-month commercial paper rate as the benchmark rate for non-monetary assets.
This approximation can be legitimate as most of the increase in participation occurred during the 1970s through certificates of deposits, which pay an interest rate close to the 6-month commercial paper rate.
From equation (1), both interest rate and wealth affect participation decisions.
The opportunity cost of monetary assets, computed as the difference between the 6-month commercial paper rate and a weighted average of the interest rates paid on monetary assets, was 1.5 percent in 1962, and this value was also the average of the opportunity cost during the postwar period before it started rising in the mid-1960s.
In the 1980s and 1990s, checkable and savings deposits have been yielding interest and have not been subject to interest rates ceilings. Their opportunity cost has been trendless but fluctuating, as banks do not pass short-term market rates fluctuations on deposit rates 13 , and it averaged at 2.5 percent during the deregulated period. We can compute the share of the increase in participation attributable to changes in interest rates using the non-parametric method described above, with the product of wealth times the opportunity cost as an explanatory variable for participation. The 13 See Moore, Porter and Small (1990) .
increase in opportunity cost turns out to account for about a third of the increase in participation, so that wealth, interest rates and participation costs account each for a third of the increase in participation.
Using the fact that both interest rate and wealth affect participation, we can obtain further knowledge on the nature of participation costs. Assuming a per period cost only, the non-parametric methodology can be used to recover the cost function for given years. In this case however, the resulting implied cost would fluctuate over time in an implausible way, as the behavior of participation in the 1980s and 1990s is too smooth relative to opportunity cost fluctuations. Thus a per period cost does not appear to be the only relevant cost, and part of the cost of participating must take the form of a once-and-for-all entry cost or a fixed cost. As panel data are not available, I estimated a probit model with lagged opportunity costs, and found that changes in interest rates have very persistent effects on participation, but coefficients could not be precisely estimated. Moreover, those findings are consistent with the evidence presented in Vissing-Jørgensen (2002), who analyses participation cost structures using repeated-panel data. She finds evidence for the presence of important fixed and/or entry costs and for the potential role of per period costs, but was not able to quantify the relative importance of those costs even with panel data.
The presence of a cost not to be renewable every year or even a once-and-for-all cost of entering the financial market can explain the evolution in participation presented in this paper. The increase in inflation and interest rates in the 1970s, combined with regulations on deposits' interest rate ceilings 14 , prompted households to learn about financial markets and interest-bearing assets like certificates of deposits or mutual funds. This also prompted financial institutions to offer alternative assets and to provide more easily accessible information about these assets, thus decreasing participation costs. After that episode, people did not withdraw much from non-monetary assets when interest rates declined in the 1980s, since they had already acquired knowledge about financial markets. Therefore, long-lasting changes in interest rates have significant effects on participation, and thus on money demand relationships as we will see below.
EXTENSIVE MARGINS AND MONEY DEMAND STABILITY
This section uses the analysis of financial market participation presented above to address the issue of money demand stability. Two particular events lead economists to question the stability of money demand. The first one was the period of "missing money" in the 1970s, when standard money demand equations systematically overpredicted actual money holdings 15 . Then, following that episode, transaction balances became more sensitive to interest rate fluctuations 16 .
The idea behind using cross-sections to understand time series of monetary aggregates is that both the downward shift in money demand and the subsequent higher interest rate elasticity observed in time series can be understood in the presence of a fixed cost of holding non-monetary financial assets. As real financial wealth and the opportunity cost of money increase, as they did in the 1970s, more people find it worth it to pay the cost and hold part of their financial assets in the form of interest-bearing 15 See Judd and Scadding (1982) .
non-monetary assets. This induces a downward shift in money demand, as well as a higher interest rate elasticity, as only financial market participants can substitute between monetary and non-monetary assets when interest rates fluctuate.
I first present the evolution of monetary assets during the postwar period, and then assess the influence of changes in participation on aggregate money demand, relating the increase in financial market participation to the apparent instability of money demand. The effect of the velocity shift on money demand relationships appears clearly when we plot the real money-income ratio against the opportunity cost of MA, as shown 17 Velocity is nominal GDP divided by MA. The opportunity cost is the 3-month Treasury bill rate minus the weighted average of interest rates paid on the different monetary assets.
Time Series Behavior of Monetary Assets
18 Data sources are displayed in the appendix. MA correspond to M2 minus small time deposits. The report on the 1998 SCF groups these assets as "Transaction Accounts" (see Kennickell et al., 2000) . For a study of monetary assets in the context of Divisia or Currency-Equivalent indexes, see Rotemberg et al. (1995) . Motley (1988) , Poole (1991) , and Carlson and Keen (1996) consider a group of assets close to this one with an analysis based on maturities. 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 Opportunity Cost (Percent) Table 4 . The interest rate elasticity is higher after the velocity shift than before, and the income elasticity is not significantly different from unity in the two sub-samples.
Households' Participation and Aggregate Money Demand
We can make two interesting observations from Figure 2 and column (1) of Table 1 . 1949-1969 1970-1976 1977-1999 Fig. 3. Quarterly Money Demand (1949 Demand ( -1999 to a period where the fraction of households holding non-monetary assets increased significantly; and later, in the 1980s and 1990s, when the fraction of financial market participants remained almost constant, MA velocity followed closely the opportunity cost. The second interesting observation is that, from Figure 2 , the interest rate elasticity of money demand seems to be higher in the 1980s and 1990s, when participation was higher, than in the 1950s and 1960s. I will characterize the effects of changes in participation on these two facts.
It is also instructive to compare the evolution of M1 velocity 19 , presented in Figure ment techniques by firms. However, data on Demand Deposit Ownership Surveys 21 conducted at the Federal Reserve Board show that, while there has indeed been an increase in the ratio of demand deposits owned by firms relative to households during the 1970s, this explanation is not sufficient to account for the velocity shift. In particular, the ratio does not change much with the two interest rate drops. Moreover, the velocity of savings accounts exhibits an upward shift in velocity as well, and firms
were not allowed to hold these accounts before the mid-1970s, and held only a small fraction of the total amount of these accounts thereafter. Accounting for the behavior of households as well is thus needed. Another reason to focus on participation for the upward velocity shift and the higher interest rate elasticity of monetary assets is that, in the late 1960s and 1970s, a sharp and substantial increase in the amount of small time deposits (CD under $100,000), which accounted for most of the increase in participation, corresponds precisely to the downward shift in the demand for monetary assets, and then the velocities of CD and MA moved in opposite directions, reflecting changes in opportunity costs and substitutions between monetary and non-monetary assets.
While it is not possible to quantify precisely the relative share of households' money holdings, some facts from time series, the nature of different accounts and data from the Flow of Funds Accounts allow us to state that households hold the main part of MA. Savings accounts represented about 60 percent of MA in the 1960s and 1970s, and were offered exclusively to households until the mid-1970s. Even though firms have been allowed to hold them since, Flow of Funds data, and Porter et al. (1979) suggest that the firms' share of these accounts has been small. In the 1980s and 1990s, the share of savings accounts and money market deposit accounts in MA went down 21 See Farr, Porter, and Pruitt (1978) . that "other checkable deposits" account for about half of the total amount of checking deposits in the 1980s and 1990s, and that they were offered exclusively to households, we can confidently say that households hold a large part of checking accounts as well.
To measure the extend to which the velocity of money held by households has shifted in the 1970s, I compute the upward shift in velocity between two years for which surveys were available and when the opportunity cost of monetary assets was similar, to isolate the upward velocity shift from variations in money demand caused by interest rate changes. Given the evolution of the opportunity cost displayed in Figure 2 and the different surveys presented in Table 1 , it is natural to compare 1962 with 1992: financial market participation had stabilized in 1992 and the opportunity cost of monetary assets was at the same level than in 1962. The velocity of monetary assets increases by 25 percent between the two periods. The causes of this upward velocity shift will be assessed in the next section.
Participation and the Velocity Shift
This section quantifies the influence of the increase in financial market participation on the downward shift in households' money demand. The main finding is that without the increase in financial market participation, the upward shift in velocity would not have occurred.
First note that aggregate money demand can be expressed 22 as
where A is financial wealth, T can represent a measure of transactions or wealth, and the 1980s and 1990s, but without a change in participation this shift would not have generated an upward shift in aggregate velocity.
Participation and Aggregate Elasticity
To assess the influence of participation on the aggregate interest rate elasticity, consider again aggregate money demand as expressed in equation (2). The aggregate interest rate elasticity can then be expressed as
where P R is the interest rate elasticity for participants. The aggregate money demand elasticity is thus equal to the elasticity of money demand for participants times the share of total money demand held by participants. Time series estimates are presented in Table 4 . The cointegrating relation
is estimated by dynamic ordinary least squares (Stock and Watson, 1993) with quarterly data 24 . m is MA, p is the GDP price deflator, y is real GDP, and r is the opportunity cost of MA as defined in section 4.1. All variables are in logarithm.
The interest rate elasticity increases (in absolute value) from -.065 before the velocity shift , to -.134 for the period following the shift Given that the opportunity cost and velocity show no trend in the two sub-periods, we obtain a unitary income elasticity for those samples. As the increase in participation induced a decline in money holdings while income was growing, the income elasticity estimated over the postwar period is biased downward. Increases in financial market participation thus tend to inappropriately suggest progress in the transaction technology or scale economies in money holdings. Moreover, the fact that interest rates increased when the downward money demand shift occurred produces an upward bias in the estimated postwar interest rate elasticity, which turns out to be higher than an average of the coefficients estimated for the two sub-samples. The estimated interest rate elasticity is further flawed by the fact that the underlying aggregate interest rate elasticity was evolving during the 1970s, as progressively more people became able to substitute between monetary and non-monetary assets.
CONCLUSION
Money demand studies have mostly been based on time series analysis, and many of them concluded that money demand relationships are not stable across time or 1962, 1983, 1989, 1992, 1995, and 1998 , were obtained from the Federal Reserve Board, and the additional surveys were obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) through the Data Library at the University of Chicago.
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